First, Some scholars argue that Scheppele’s framework risks labeling any aggressive, partisan use of legal power as “autocratic.” If a democratic majority packs a court (as FDR threatened), is that autocratic legalism? Scheppele answers with a distinction of entrenchment versus policy . FDR wanted to change policy; Orbán wanted to change the ability of future majorities to ever change policy again . The latter is autocratic legalism; the former is constitutional hardball within a still-competitive system.
No scholar has done more to diagnose, name, and theorize this paradox than , the Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Sociology and International Affairs at Princeton University (and formerly a long-time affiliated faculty at the University of Pennsylvania ’s Law School—a frequent source of confusion given her deep ties to the Penn legal community). Her master concept— autocratic legalism —has become the indispensable keyword for understanding how modern authoritarians use the tools of law to kill the spirit of law. autocratic legalism kim lane scheppele upd
Autocratic legalism sits in the treacherous space between them. It is, Scheppele writes, the use of liberal legal forms to achieve autocratic ends . The autocrat does not burn the constitution; he reinterprets it. He does not abolish parliament; he shrinks its quorum. He does not jail all opposition journalists; he passes a defamation law with such breathtakingly vague standards that only the government’s critics are charged. The latter is autocratic legalism; the former is
Then came the 2010s. Observers watched in bewilderment as elected leaders in Hungary, Poland, Turkey, and eventually the United States began dismantling democratic guardrails not with bayonets, but with briefs. They amended constitutions. They packed courts. They rewrote electoral laws. They declared emergencies and cited legal texts. To the casual eye, the machinery of law was still humming. But the destination had changed. Her master concept— autocratic legalism —has become the